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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Constitution article VIII, section 4, which provides that "The Supreme Court by rule 
shall govern the practice of law, including admission to practice law and the 
conduct and discipline of persons admitted to practice law." 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
I. Whether the district court erred when it imposed a three-year 
suspension upon the Respondent, Jonathan W. Grimes, but then stayed all but 181 
days, when the court found that the attorney had knowledge that a client's funds 
were not properly safeguarded and used for the lawyer's own purposes before they 
were earned. The standard of review for sanctions imposed for professional 
misconduct in attorney discipline actions is a correctness standard, but the Utah 
Supreme Court may make an independent judgment regarding the appropriate 
level of discipline if the evidence warrants it. See In re Babilis, 951 P.2d 207 
(Utah 1997). This issue was preserved through closing argument and through the 
Sanctions Hearing Brief submitted to the district court. [R. 351 at 109, R. 278-
297] 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The following rules are fully set forth in the Addendum to Brief of 
Petitioner, submitted herewith: 
Rule 1.2 (Scope of Representation), Rules of Professional Conduct 
Rule 1.3 (Diligence), Rules of Professional Conduct 
Rule 1.4 (Communication), Rules of Professional Conduct 
l 
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Rule 1.5 (Fees), Rules of Professional Conduct 
Rule 8.4 (Misconduct), Rules of Professional Conduct 
Rule 14-603 Sanction, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. 
Rule 14-604 Factors to be Considered in Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. 
Rule 14-605 Imposition of Sanctions, Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions. 
Rule 14-607 Aggravation and Mitigation, Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: This is an attorney discipline case. The district court 
suspended the Respondent, Jonathan W. Grimes ("Grimes"), under circumstances 
in which he should have been disbarred. The Utah State Bar's Office of 
Professional Conduct ("OPC") appeals the district court's decision, and urges the 
Court to reverse it, and instead to enter an order of disbarment against Grimes. 
The Course of Proceedings: The OPC filed a Complaint against Grimes 
on June 20, 2008 [R. 1-10] On June 2, 2010, the district court presided over a trial 
to determine whether Grimes violated the Rules of Professional Conduct ("Rules"). 
[R. 350] The district court found that Grimes violated Rule 1.2(a) (Scope of 
Representation); 1.3 (Diligence); Rule 1.4(a) (Communication); Rule 1.5(a) (Fees); 
Rules 8.4 (a), (c), and (d) (Misconduct), and issued Findings of Fact and 
Conclusion of Law. [R. 211] The matter then proceeded to a sanctions hearing on 
November 8, 2010. [R. 351] 
2 
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Disposition in the Trial Court: Following the sanctions hearing, the district 
court entered an Order of Sanction against Grimes and suspended him from the 
practice of law for a period of three years, with all but 181 days stayed. [R. 331-344] 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. Mr. Bill Riordan ("Riorden") hired Grimes in June 2005 to represent 
him in a discrimination case. [R. 350 at 48] 
2. Riordan paid a $10,000 retainer. [Id. at 49] At the time, Grimes 
worked for attorney J. Kent Holland. [Id. at 16] The retainer was placed in 
Holland's attorney trust account. [Id.] 
3. Grimes left the Holland firm sometime in 2006 and took Riordan's 
file and case with him. 
4. On June 9, 2006, Holland's secretary gave a check in the amount 
of $7,070 to Grimes, representing that it was the remainder of Riordan's retainer. 
[R. 350 at 89] 
5. Grimes failed to communicate with Mr. Riordan from approximately 
January 2007 to December 2007. [R. 202] 
6. In March 2007, Riordan left numerous messages for Grimes, and 
eventually talked to his secretary about the case. [Id.] 
7. On June 25, 2007, Riordan mailed Grimes a letter requesting 
information about his case. Grimes did not respond. [Id.] 
8. On July 21, 2007, Riordan sent Grimes a certified letter. [Id.] That 
letter was returned to Riordan in August 2007. [Id. at 203] 
9. Riordan continued trying to communicate with Grimes via telephone 
3 
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and fax, but was unsuccessful in getting a response. [Id.] 
10. Because Grimes failed to pursue Riordan's case, the case was 
dismissed. [Id.] 
11. Grimes did not inform Riordan that the case had been dismissed. 
[Id.] 
12. Grimes failed to return the unearned portion of the retainer, even 
though Riordan asked repeatedly for the money to be returned. [Id.] 
13. On December 22, 2008, Riordan sent a letter to Grimes asking for 
an accounting of his retainer and requesting the unused portion be sent to his 
new attorney. [Id.] 
14. The district court concluded that the above described conduct violated 
the following Rules of Professional Conduct: Rule 1.2(a) (Scope of 
Representation); 1.3 (Diligence); Rule 1.4(a) (Communication); Rule 1.5(a) (Fees); 
and, Rules 8.4 (a), (c), and (d) (Misconduct). [R. 211] 
15. Following a sanctions hearing, the district court concluded that the 
presumptive sanction for Grimes1 misconduct, under Rule 14-605 Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, was disbarment. [R. 341] 
16. Based upon the evidence presented at the sanctions hearing, the 
district court found the following mitigating factors: 1) the absence of a record of 
prior discipline; 2) inexperience in the practice of law; 3) personal and emotional 
problems; 4) good character or reputation; 5) interim reform; and 6) remorse. [Id 
at 339-341] 
17. The district court also found the following aggravating factors: 1) 
4 
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selfish or dishonest motive and 2) refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of 
the misconduct either to the client or to the disciplinary authority. [Id. at 337-338] 
18. Though the district court found that the presumptive sanction for 
Grimes' misconduct was disbarment, it ruled that justice would be better served 
in this case with a lesser sanction, and suspended Grimes from the practice of 
law for three-years, with all but 181 days of the suspension stayed. [R. 341-342] 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The district court's decision to suspend Grimes, rather than disbar him, is 
contrary to established law: Grimes should have been disbarred for his 
misappropriation of a client's money. Based upon the evidence presented to the 
district court, the presumptive sanction for Grimes' misconduct, according to the 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions and Utah case law, was disbarment. 
The court correctly reached that conclusion, but then reduced the presumptive 
sanction to a three-year suspension. The facts presented to the district court in 
this case did not warrant the departure from the presumptive sanction, and the 
OPC asks this Court to review the matter and enter an order of disbarment 
against Grimes. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The District Court's Decision to Reduce the Presumptive Sanction of 
Disbarment to a Lesser Sanction was Contrary to Established Law 
Concerning Discipline in Misappropriation Cases 
The correct presumptive sanction for Grimes' actions under the Standards 
for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions ("Standards") is disbarment. Though a district 
court is allowed flexibility in crafting attorney sanctions, when a case involves the 
5 
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misappropriation of client funds, only truly compelling mitigation can reduce the 
sanction from disbarment. Grimes failed to offer truly compelling mitigation, and 
the district court erred by reducing the disbarment to a three-year suspension. 
A. Based Upon the Facts Established in the Adjudication Hearing, 
Grimes' Misconduct Constitutes a Presumptive Disbarment Case 
Under the Standards 
The presumptive sanction in this case is disbarment. This is dictated by 
the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions ("Standards") and by case law in 
this jurisdiction and most, if not all, other jurisdictions. 
The Standards set forth presumptive sanctions for broad categories of 
misconduct, absent the existence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances. 
Pursuant to the Standards disbarment is the presumptive sanction if the attorney: 
(a)(1) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in 
Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional conduct with 
the intent to benefit the lawyer or another or to deceive the court, 
and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, the 
public, or the legal system, or causes serious or potentially serious 
interference with a legal proceeding; 
(a)(2) engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary element of 
which includes intentional interference with the administration of 
justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, 
misappropriation, or theft; . . . 
(a)(3) engages in any other intentional misconduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously 
adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. 
See Rule 14-605, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. 
Grimes' misconduct, according to this Court's decisions in similar cases, 
falls within the language of Rule 14-605(a)(1) and 14-605(a)(3). In In re Johnson, 
this Court found that disbarment was the appropriate presumptive sanction under 
both Rule 14-605(a)(1) and Rule 14-605(a)(c). In re Johnson, 48 P.3d 881 (Utah 
6 
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2001) This Court found that Johnson knowingly violated the Rules, with the intent 
to benefit himself, and that his conduct caused serious or potentially serious 
injury to the party, public or legal system. This Court made those findings based 
upon Johnson's violations of Rules 1.15(a), 1.15(b) and 1.15(c) for his failure to 
return funds to his client and his comingling of the funds, stating that "[t]he trial 
court's finding that Johnson knowingly violated rule 1.15 of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct for his own benefit was sufficient to support disbarment." In 
re Johnson, 48 P.3d at 886. Violations of Rule 1.15 are not present in this case. 
That, however, does not mean that the underlying misconduct is different than 
the misbehavior this Court addressed in the Johnson case. 
In Johnson, in addition to finding that disbarment was appropriate under 
Rule 14-605(a)(1), this Court also found that disbarment was appropriate under 
Rule 14-605(a)(3) because the Court held that misappropriation is intentional 
conduct involving dishonesty that seriously reflects on the lawyer's fitness to 
practice law. /of. at 881, 885. In other words, this Court found that 
misappropriation was per se "intentional conduct involving dishonesty." 
Johnson and the present case both present situations where an attorney 
has misappropriated client funds. Johnson settled a case for his client. While he 
initially put the money in trust, he then took the money out, and by the time the 
client asked for the money had converted it for his own use. Johnson did not 
return the money to his client and offered no satisfactory explanation for why he 
kept the money. Grimes' case is similar. Grimes was provided $7,070.00 in 
unearned retained fees for his client, Riordan, when he stopped working with 
7 
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Holland. He knew that money was for Riordan's case, and he knew it wasn't 
earned, but he took the money and used it for his own purposes. 
Johnson asserted as a defense that there was a question of fact about 
whether the client was entitled to the funds, /of. This Court found that even if it 
accepted the fact that there was a dispute as to amount owed to the client, 
Johnson had misappropriated the funds because he knew that he had not been 
gifted the entire amount. In this case, Grimes committed misappropriation 
because he knew that the funds he accepted belonged to Riordan, yet he failed 
to keep them in trust or return them to his client upon request. 
Other cases in Utah and in other jurisdictions hold that disbarment is the 
appropriate sanction for misappropriation of client funds. In In re Babilis, an 
attorney was disbarred for charging substantial fees for little work, 
misappropriating the funds from his client's estate, and making 
misrepresentations to the client and the probate court. In re Babilis, 951 P.2d 207 
(Utah 1997). In another Utah case, an attorney was disbarred for 
misappropriation with the Court stating that misappropriation of client funds, 
alone, is enough to trigger disbarment without the cumulative effect of other 
misconduct. In re Ennenga, 37 P.3d 1150 (Utah 2001). In Colorado, "when a 
lawyer knowingly converts client funds, disbarment is 'virtually automatic,' at least 
in the absence of significant factors in mitigation." People v. Young, 864 P.2d 563 
(Colo. 1993). In another Colorado case an attorney was disbarred for two counts 
of abandonment of clients and conversion of client funds. People v. Righter, 35 
P.3d 159 (Colo. 1999). 
8 
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This Court has consistently found that misappropriate ? client funds is 
the most serious of all attorney misconduct, and is grounds for disbarment 
mitigating factors, however, it is appropriate to presume that the case warrants 
disbarment The district court correctly reached this conclusion, but then 
undercut the seriousness of the misconduct and reduced the disbarment to a 
three-year suspension, with all but 181 days stayed. The OPC's contention on 
appeal is that the district court did i lot 1 1a1 /e tl le discretioi i to r edi ice the sanctioi i 
in this case. 
B. Iaken in the Light Post Favorable to Grimes, the Evidence 
Presented to the District Court was Insufficient to Justify a Departure 
From Disbarment 
1- The Mitigation Presented Was Not Truly Compelling 
The district court heard evidence regarding factors of mitigation and 
aggravatior i if i ordei tc read i tl le • i iltimate saiidi< ni Grimes «>(MH IIJI 1 was 
intentional misappropriation, requiring disbarment absent truly compelling 
r II litigatioi i„ I I lere was i IO evidei ice pi eser ited at tl iat Sanctions Hearing that this 
Court would consider truly compelling mitigation. 
This Court has articulated that in attorney discipline cases involving 
n tisappropi iation, the sanctioi i i : >1 ' disbarmt - nggered even without the 
cumulative effect of other Rule violations1. In re Ennenga, 2001 UT 111, P10. 
1
 Grimes violated several of the Rules of Professional Conduct, but, as this Court 
has opined in similar cases, the Rule violations involving misappropriation are 
sufficient to presume disbarment without considering other Rules the attorney 
may have violated. 
9 
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Once that sanction is triggered, in order to overcome the "presumption of 
disbarment, 'the aggravating and mitigating factors must be significant.' In fact, 
they must be 'truly compelling.'" Id,, quoting In re Ince, 957 P.2d 1233, at 1237 
and In re Babilis, 951 P.2d at 217, respectively. In this case Grimes failed to 
present any evidence that could properly be classified as compelling mitigation 
for his actions. 
Grimes offered evidence to support several factors of mitigation under 
Rule 14-607(b) of the Standards. The district court concluded that the following 
factors applied to this case: 1) the absence of a record of prior discipline; 2) 
inexperience in the practice of law; 3) personal and emotional problems; 4) good 
character or reputation; 5) interim reform; and 6) remorse.2 R. 339-341. These 
factors do not constitute truly compelling mitigation. 
Serious misconduct is not easily mitigated. See e.g. In re Brewster, 587 
A.2d 1067 (Del 1991) (mitigating factors including sincere, deep regret and 
attempt to rectify consequences did not overcome attorney's failure to maintain 
personal integrity by engaging in serious criminal conduct resulting in conviction 
for bank fraud). The Supreme Court of Iowa has noted that although its 
sympathy is frequently aroused by attorneys' personal problems, "protection of 
the public interest prevents us from being swayed by them." See Iowa Supreme 
2
 Though the district court found that remorse was a factor in mitigation, the court 
tempered that finding by stating: "It is clear from the evidence that remorse and 
restitution have not been at the forefront of Mr. Grimes' actions. He has yet to 
make any for of repayment to Mr. Riordan. He has admitted that he believes he 
owes Mr. Riordan $7,070 plus interest." R. 340-341. With that said, remorse 
certainly could not have been a truly compelling factor of mitigation. 
10 
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Court. Bd. i )f Pi of. Ethics and Conduct v. Sunleaf, 588 N.W.2d 126, 127 (Iowa 
1999). Further, 
Nearly every lawyer involved in these cases could cite personal 
problems as the cause of the professional downfall. But life in 
general is a series of problems and it is the fundamental purpose of 
our profession to face and solve them. Our profession certainly 
cannot excuse misconduct on the basis of personal problems. 
Id. (quoting Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Cook, 409 N.W.2d 
469, 470 (Iowa 1987)). 
The factors of mitigation Grimes presented to the? district court do not 
establish the kind of truly compelling mitigation that this Court has stated are 
necessary to reduce a presumptive disbarment in a misappropriation case down 
to a lesser sanction. Grimes' misappropriated $7,070.00 from his client. It is true 
that he was new to the practice of law, and that he did not have a previous record 
of discipline. For matter's dealh ig wit! i cliei it fi n ids, tl lose factors of mitigation are 
not significant. It does not take substantial experience in the practice of law to 
know that you are not entitled to take a client's money. 1 1 lat type ol " I ;i lowing, 
dishonest misconduct is not something an attorney learns to avoid through 
practice and experience. Further, that an attorney hasn't engaged in misconduct 
previously does not *• • urst iristance of misappropriation should be 
looked at in a more favorable light. Misappropriation is the most serious of all 
attorney d«M i|»lmo niRtl«jo , ood I*"1 ibsonce of a |nIOI u»i oid <>t discipline should 
not rise to the level of compelling, or even significant, mitigation. 
On the issue of Grimes' emotion problems, the district court found: "Mr. 
Grimes, family members and otl lei s testified os lo IIio emotional pt'obloms Mr. 
n 
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Grimes was facing during the initial period of this incident, including his own 
depression coupled with the hospitalization if his infant child." R. at 340. Again, 
this finding of mitigation does not rise to the level of truly compelling. In the 
Ennenga case, the Court was presented with an attorney who also offered 
emotional problems as a factor of mitigation. In re Ennenga, 2001 UT 111 at If 14. 
Ennenga had asserted that his personal and emotional problems, stemming from 
his inability to meet his own financial obligations, had led him to take client 
money. Id. This Court stated that: 
Although we understand that the pressure of not being able to meet one's 
financial obligations can be great, we cannot condone the taking of a 
client's money to resolve that problem, even with the intent to return their 
funds. Personal financial pressures cannot mitigate the offense of 
misappropriation. See In re Blumenstyk, 152 N.J. 158, 704 A.2d 1, 4 (N.J. 
1997) ("Family financial pressures cannot excuse an attorney's ethical 
dereliction.") 
Id. 
The emotional problems Grimes presented are unfortunate, but do not constitute 
truly compelling mitigation. They cannot be considered an important factor that 
would reduce the proper sanction of disbarment in this case. 
The remaining two factors, that Grimes displayed interim reform and a 
good reputation, also do not rise to the level of truly compelling mitigation. Like 
the absence of a prior record and inexperience in the practice of law, a good 
reputation and interim reform can mitigate less serious misconduct such as 
diligence, or a lack of adequate communication with a client. They are not factors 
which rise to the level of truly compelling mitigation, and should not be used to 
depart from disbarment in a misappropriation case. 
12 
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The mitigation Grimes' offered is not truly compelling. Because that is the 
requirement for a district court when a presumptive disbarment is reduced in a. 
misappropriatioi i case, tl le 01 }C wai ited to addi ess tl ie mitigation that was 
presented to the district court. The district court detailed that mitigation, but it did 
not necessarily use any of it as tl ie i easoi i it lessei led Gi ii nes" sai ictioi i. h istead, 
the district court relied upon this Court's decision in In re Discipline of Crawley, 
2007 UT 44 (2007) to reduce the presumptive disbarment. The OPC disagrees 
that the Crawley decision allows a district court such flexibility in cases of 
misappropriation. 
2. Crawley is Not Applicable to Misappropriation Cases 
The district court cited this Court's decision in Crawley m its i nder of 
Sanction ; i. The district court quoted Crawley, and stated that the guidance 
provided by this Court regarding a "triangle of justice, protection and 
rehabilitatioi i" was appropriate to i ise ii i tl lis case Id t eferring to Crawley 2007 
UT 44, fl 22, 23. Crawley was not a misappropriation case, and the Court's 
guidance in that matter is not correctly applicable ID misappropriation casi :s 
Stevei i Crawley ("Ci awley") violated Ri lies I I  (Competence); 1.2(a) 
(Scope of Represenation); 1.3 (Diligence); 1.4(a) (Communication); and, 8.4 (a) 
and (c) (Misconduct) --J- was suspended by the distort < ouri HIP distnct « mirt 
stayed the suspension and placed him on probation, and the OPC appealed to 
this Court concerning the district court's use of probation. Crawley, 2007 1 11 44, i| 
7. i '3wie- - lisconduct did not iHate to client funds or misappropriation. 
Essentially, he failed to communicate with his firm and his client about his failures 
13 
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to diligently pursue his client's cases, and, ultimately misrepresented to them the 
true nature of the underlying actions. Id. at fl 3-5. The OPC appealed the district 
court's decision to stay the suspension he received, as we did not believe 
probation was appropriate given the dishonest elements of his misconduct. This 
Court disagreed and affirmed the district court's use of probation. Id. at ^ 25. 
This Court's analysis and guidance in the Crawley case is applicable to 
attorney discipline cases which do not involve presumptive disbarments for 
misappropriation. It was not correctly used by the district court to reduce Grimes' 
presumptive disbarment. The "truly compelling mitigation" standard is the only 
standard that this Court has recognized in cases of misappropriation. See In re 
Ennenga, 2001 UT 111 (2001); In re Ince, 957 P.2d 1233 (Utah 1998); and, In re 
Babilis, 951 P.2d 207 (Utah 1997). 
The district court cited the following section of Crawley in its Order of 
Sanction: "... we note that the imposition of probation with the right conditions 
may in some cases be more protective of the public than a period of suspension." 
R. 341, quoting Crawley 2007 UT 44, fl 23. The basis for this Court's statement 
was that in some cases a district court may craft a probationary period with 
attorney-specific terms that allows the attorney to change their ways, and protects 
the public from the attorney's future misconduct. Id. When the district court 
presented its ruling to the OPC and Grimes on February 4, 2011, the court stated: 
"Mr. Grimes, I spent a lot of time thinking about this case. I'm giving you an 
unbelievable chance to redeem yourself." R. 352 at pg. 9. The court's apparent 
sympathy for Grimes' does not, however, mean that it was proper to go outside 
14 
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this Court's case law and guidance regarding disbarments for misappropriation 
cases. The district court did not find that there was truly compelling mitigation, 
and incniriecli / applied lh< CMW/H .isc to much more serious attorney 
misconduct to reduce a presumptive disbarment to suspension and probation. 
The Oi~ •" "moc this Coi JI t to reverse tl lat decisioi i ai id ei itei at i Oi dei of 
disbarment against Grimes. 
CONCLUSION 
Grimes misappropriated client funds. I his '"' nuil has hcon deai Illhal the 
sanction foi that misconduct is disbarment, absent truly compelling mitigation. 
Grimes did not present such mitigation, but the district court still reduced the 
sanctior i to a suspension t Tl ie Crawley decision does not change this Court's 
guidance in misappropriation cases, and the district court erred in using it as a 
basis foi the sanctioi \ reduction The OPO asks this Court to reverse fhf* district 
court and enter an Order of disbarment against Grimes for his serious 
misconduct. 
DATED: June C~ ,2011. 
• Orr-ICl: OhPR* )KE.SSI(.)NAL CONDI J I ' . . 
^^V^^ . 
Adam C. Bevis 
Assistant Counsel 
Billy L Walker 
Senior Counsel 
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Rules of Central Importance Cited In the Brief 
Rule 1.2 (Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between 
Client and Lawyer) 
(a) Subject to paragraphs (c) and (d), a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions 
concerning the objectives of representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall 
consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer 
may take such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out 
the representation. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to settle a 
matter. In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after 
consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial 
and whether the client will testify. 
(b) A lawyer's representation of a client, including representation by appointment, 
does not constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or 
moral views or activities. 
(c) A lawyer may limit the scope of tl\e representation if the limitation is 
reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent. 
(d) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct 
that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the 
legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may 
counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, 
scope, meaning or application of the law. 
! : .- • • 1 3 (Diligei ice) 
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a 
client. 
Rule 1.4 (Communication) 
(a) A lawyer shall 1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance 
with respect to which the client's informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(e), is 
required by these Rules; 2) reasonably consult with the client about the means 
by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished; 3) keep the client 
reasonably informed about the status of the matter; 4) promptly comply with 
reasonable requests for information; and 5) consult with the client about any 
relevant limitation on the lawyer's conduct when the lawyer knows that the client 
expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other 
law." 
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit 
the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation. 
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Rule 1.5 (Fees) 
(a) A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge or collect an unreasonable 
fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in 
determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following 1) the time and 
labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill 
requisite to perform the legal service properly; 2) the likelihood, if apparent to the 
client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other 
employment by the lawyer; 3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for 
similar legal services; 4) the amount involved and the results obtained; 5) the 
time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; 6) the nature and 
length of the professional relationship with the client; 7) the experience, 
reputation and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and 8) 
whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
(b) The scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee and expenses 
for which the client will be responsible shall be communicated to the client, 
preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the 
representation, except when the lawyer will charge a regularly represented client 
on the same basis or rate. Any changes in the basis or rate of the fee or 
expenses shall also be communicated to the client. 
(c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is 
rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph 
(d) or other law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in a writing signed by the 
client and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including 
the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of 
settlement, trial or appeal; litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the 
recovery; and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the 
contingent fee is calculated. The agreement must clearly notify the client of any 
expenses for which the client will be liable whether or not the client is the 
prevailing party. Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall 
provide the client with a written statement stating the outcome of the matter and, 
if there is a recovery, showing the remittance to the client and the method of its 
determination. 
(d) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge or collect: 1) any fee 
in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of which is contingent 
upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support, or 
property settlement in lieu thereof; or 2) a contingent fee for representing a 
defendant in a criminal case. 
(e) A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be 
made only if: 1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each 
lawyer or each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation; 2) the 
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client agrees to the arrangement, including the share each lawyer will receive, 
and the agreement is confirmed in writing; and 3) the total fee is reasonable. 
Rule 8.4 (Misconduct) 
(a) It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to violate or attempt to violate the 
Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do 
so through the acts of another. 
(b) It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to commit a criminal act that reflects 
adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other 
respects. 
(c) It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage it i coi lduct inn rolving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. 
(d) "It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice. 
(e) It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to state or imply an ability to 
influence improperly a government agency or official or to achieve results by 
means that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. 
(f) It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to knowingly assist a judge or judicial 
officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other 
law. 
Rule 14-603. Sanctions, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. 
(a) Scope. A disciplinary sanction is imposed on a lawyer upon a finding or 
acknowledgement that the lawyer has engaged in professional misconduct. 
(b) Disbarment. Disbarment terminates the individual's status as a lawyer. A 
lawyer who has been disbarred may be readmitted as provided in Rule 14-525. 
(c) Suspension. Suspension is the removal of a lawyer from the practice of law 
for a specified minimum period of time. Generally, suspension should be 
imposed for a specific period of time equal to or greater than six months, but in 
no event should the time period prior to application for reinstatement be more 
than three years. 
(c)(1) A lawyer who has been suspended for six months or less may be 
reinstated as set forth in Rule 14-524. 
(c)(2) A lawyer who has been suspended for more than six months may 
be reinstated as set forth in Rule 14-525. 
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(d) Interim suspension. Interim suspension is the temporary suspension of a 
lawyer from the practice of law. Interim suspension may be imposed as set forth 
in Rules 14-518 and 14-519. 
(e) Reprimand. Reprimand is public discipline which declares the conduct of the 
lawyer improper, but does not limit the lawyer's right to practice. 
(f) Admonition. Admonition is nonpublic discipline which declares the conduct of 
the lawyer improper, but does not limit the lawyer's right to practice. 
(g) Probation. Probation is a sanction that allows a lawyer to practice law under 
specified conditions. Probation can be public or nonpublic, can be imposed alone 
or in conjunction with other sanctions, and can be imposed as a condition of 
readmission or reinstatement. 
(h) Resignation with discipline pending. Resignation with discipline pending is a 
form of public discipline which allows a respondent to resign from the practice of 
law while either an informal or formal complaint is pending against the 
respondent. Resignation with discipline pending may be imposed as set forth in 
Rule 14-521. 
(i) Other sanctions and remedies. Other sanctions and remedies which may be 
imposed include: 
(i)(1) restitution; 
(i)(2) assessment of costs; 
(i)(3) limitation upon practice; 
(i)(4) appointment of a receiver; 
(i)(5) a requirement that the lawyer take the Bar Examination or 
professional responsibility examination; and 
(i)(6) a requirement that the lawyer attend continuing education courses. 
(j) Reciprocal discipline. Reciprocal discipline is the imposition of a disciplinary 
sanction on a lawyer who has been disciplined in another court, another 
jurisdiction, or a regulatory body having disciplinary jurisdiction. 
Rule 14-604. Factors to be Considered in Imposing Sanctions, Standards 
for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. 
The following factors should be considered in imposing a sanction after a finding 
of lawyer misconduct: 
(a) the duty violated; 
(b) the lawyer's mental state; 
(c) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and 
(d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. 
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Rule 14-605. Imposition of Sanctions, Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions. 
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors 
set out in Rule 14-604, the following sanctions are generally appropriate. 
(a) Disbarment. Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(a)(1) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 
8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct with the intent to 
benefit the lawyer or another or to deceive the court, and causes serious 
or potentially serious injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or 
causes serious or potentially serious interference with a legal proceeding; 
or 
(a)(2) engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary element of which 
includes intentional interference with the administration of justice, false 
swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, misappropriation, or theft; or 
the sale, distribution, or importation of controlled substances; or the 
intentional killing of another; or an attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of 
another to commit any of these offenses; or 
(a)(3) engages in any other intentional misconduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on the 
lawyer's fitness to practice law. 
(b) Suspension. Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(b)(1) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 
8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and causes 
injury or potential injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or 
causes interference or potential interference with a legal proceeding; or 
(b)(2) engages in criminal conduct that does not contain the elements 
listed in Rule 14-605(a)(2) but nevertheless seriously adversely reflects on 
the lawyer's fitness to practice law. 
(c) Reprimand. Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(c)(1) negligently engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 
8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and causes 
injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or causes interference 
with a legal proceeding; or 
(c)(2) engages in any other misconduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation and that adversely reflects on the lawyer's 
fitness to practice law. 
(d) Admonition. Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(d)(1) negligently engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 
8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and causes little 
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or no injury to a party, the public, or the legal system or interference with a 
legal proceeding, but exposes a party, the public, or the legal system to 
potential injury or causes potential interference with a legal proceeding; or 
(d)(2) engages in any professional misconduct not otherwise identified in 
this rule that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. 
Rule 14-607. Aggravation and Mitigation, Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions. 
After misconduct has been established, aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances may be considered and weighed in deciding what sanction to 
impose. 
(a) Aggravating circumstances. Aggravating circumstances are any 
considerations or factors that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline 
to be imposed. Aggravating circumstances may include: 
(a)(1) prior record of discipline; 
(a)(2) dishonest or selfish motive; 
(a)(3) a pattern of misconduct; 
(a)(4) multiple offenses; 
(a)(5) obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to 
comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary authority; 
(a)(6) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive 
practices during the disciplinary process; 
(a)(7) refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct 
involved, either to the client or to the disciplinary authority; 
(a)(8) vulnerability of victim; 
(a)(9) substantial experience in the practice of law; 
(a)(10) lack of good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the 
consequences of the misconduct involved; and 
(a)(11) illegal conduct, including the use of controlled substances. 
(b) Mitigating circumstances. Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or 
factors that may justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. 
Mitigating circumstances may include: 
(b)(1) absence of a prior record of discipline; 
(b)(2) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; 
(b)(3) personal or emotional problems; 
(b)(4) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the 
consequences of the misconduct involved; 
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(b)(5) full and free disclosure to the client or the disciplinary authority prior 
to the discovery of any misconduct or cooperative attitude toward 
proceedings; 
(b)(6) inexperience in the practice of law; 
(b)(7) good character or reputation; 
(b)(8) physical disability; 
(b)(9) mental disability or impairment, including substance abuse when: 
(b)(9)(A) the respondent is affected by a substance abuse or mental 
disability; and 
(b)(9)(B) the substance abuse or mental disability causally contributed to 
the misconduct; and 
(b)(9)(C) the respondents recovery from the substance abuse or mental 
disability is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of 
successful rehabilitation; and 
(b)(9)(D) the recovery arrested the misconduct and the recurrence of that 
misconduct is unlikely; 
(b)(10) unreasonable delay in disciplinary proceedings, provided that the 
respondent did not substantially contribute to the delay and provided 
further that the respondent has demonstrated prejudice resulting from the 
delay; 
(b)(11) interim reform in circumstances not involving mental disability or 
impairment; 
(b)(12) imposition of other penalties or sanctions; 
(b)(13) remorse; and 
(b)(14) remoteness of prior offenses. 
(c) Other circumstances. The following circumstances should not be considered 
as either aggravating or mitigating: 
(c)(1) forced or compelled restitution; 
(c)(2) withdrawal of complaint against the lawyer; 
(c)(3) resignation prior to completion of disciplinary proceedings; 
(c)(4) complainant's recommendation as to sanction; and 
(c)(5) failure of injured client to complain. 
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